Wow - what a game. I have to admit that while watching it, I regressed to pre-World Series Championship mode, where I assumed everything that could possibly go wrong would. And given the way the Sox played (poorly, that is), it would have seemed perfectly normal for us to lose 3-1. I was actually shocked by the comeback, both by Cintron's homer (made possible by a
chance occurrence) and by the fact that we didn't throw away the lead in the 9th.
My next sentence was going to be about Sox starter Freddy Garcia, but then I struggled with how exactly to structure it. So I'll give you two options, and let you decide:
A) Garcia looked terrible, but somehow settled down enough to throw the minimum definition of a quality start (6 innings, 3 runs).
B) Garcia did throw a quality start, a small miracle given how poorly he pitched - it looked like the bottom third of the Tigers' order was taking batting practice against him.
I'm actually leaning a bit towards A, mostly because Garcia retired eight of the final nine batters he faced (and the one guy who did reach base got there on a bunt single), but B is certainly true as well.
There would have been no need for Cintron's heroics if the Sox had brought home a few of the nine runners they stranded on base. But I do fault Ozzie for a tactical error that had the potential of costing the team a run or two: in the bottom of the 2nd inning, after Jermaine Dye cut the Tigers' lead in half and the Sox put the next two batters on first and second, Guillen had Cintron attempt a sacrifice bunt, trying to move the runners to second and third with one out. However, the bunt failed, with A.J. Pierzynski being thrown out at third.
But why even attempt such a bunt? We can do a cost-benefit analysis using one of my favorite tools - the Expected Runs Matrix. Basically, the Matrix tells us how many runs are scored on average during an inning, given the runners on base and the number of outs. When a situation changes, you can see how many expected runs were gained or lost. This season, teams with runners on first and second and no outs have scored an average of 1.625 runs during that inning. Let's say Cintron's bunt succeeds, and the Sox have runners on second and third and one out: that situation yields an average of 1.438 runs. So by bunting the guy over, the Sox would actually
lose some ground; this happens because outs are much more precious than baserunner positions. But what if the bunt fails, as it did last night, and the defensive team gets the lead runner out at third? With runners on first and second and one out, teams score 0.919 runs on average. So if the bunt works, we're in worse shape, and if it fails, then we're
definitely in worse shape.
But perhaps using the 2006 data is not helpful, as only a third of a season has been played. Then let's use the data for the three year period before this season, 2003-2005. During that stretch, teams in the initial situation scored, on average, 1.497 runs. With a succesful bunt, that number dropped to 1.438. With a failed bunt, with the lead runner thrown out at third, that number dropped to 0.927. So, the numbers for the three year period aren't as extreme, but the point remains the same: there is a very minor negative impact (-0.059 runs) of succesfully laying down the sacrifice bunt, and a major negative impact (-0.57 runs) of trying to do so but failing (half a run is a lot when teams only score about 4.5 per game).
The move is a little more excusable when you consider that the next batter up after Cintron was Brian Anderson, who has struggled mightily at the plate thus far. However, the bunt attempt was still foolish, and for three additional reasons beyond the statistical one detailed above: 1) playing for one run - which lessens your chance for a big inning by giving away an out - is idiotic in the 2nd inning, especially in a high run-scoring environment like The Cell; 2) playing for one run makes more sense for a team that hits poorly, which the Sox do not (.276/.350/.462 after last night); and 3) the runner on second base was our very slow catcher, thereby improving the chances that the Tigers would throw out the lead runner.
Two more quick things:
The Sox selected University of Texas right-hander Kyle McCulloch with their first pick in the amateur draft yesterday. Selecting a college pitcher fits in well with their recent draft strategy, which you can see
here in an interesting study; basically, the Sox favor college players, with a pretty even split between hitters and pitchers. Kevin Goldstein at Baseball Prospectus had this to say of McCulloch: "The Longhorns' ace this year, McCulloch was solid nearly every time out, but both his statistics and his stuff lacked any sort of 'wow' factor. It's not that teams stopped liking him, it's more that they found other guys that they liked better. McCulloch has a ton of polish and it's very easy to see him as a solid back-of-the-rotation starter... but not much more."
Lastly, if you watched the game on tv last night, perhaps you caught this gem from Hawk Harrelson: "Fernando Rodney, he of the good changeup Rodneys."